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VOLKER BORNSCHIER
ABSTRACT This paper suggests that comparative economic success is influenced by political choices which
themselves are linked to the competitive world system. Governments produce social order (or protection) as a
territorially bounded public utility, which is seen as a productive force. Citizens invest a social order with
differing degrees of legitimacy which is thus, via motivation, an important competitive resource. A multiple
regression design covering 18 Western core societies over the postwar era is used to test whether legitimacy,
operationalized as relative absence of mass political protest, has an effect on comparative overall economic
performance once initial wealth, absolute and relative size of government and membership in trading blocs are
controlled for. We find robust empirical evidence for a positive impact of legitimacy on growth in the postwar
era. The study thus suggests additional support for the theory of the 'world market for protection', developed
elsewhere to explain long-term economic success and societal convergence at the core of the world system.
INTRODUCTION they benefited more from one of the sources of
In the postwar era core Western countries comparative advantage in the competitive world
adopted a new politico-economic regime system to which we draw special attention,
embedded in a changed societal model namely legitimacy.
(Bornschier, 1988). This new societal model What we suggest is that comparative
represented more than mere interventionist economic success is not altogether endogenous
economic policy; it recruited unprecedented to the economy, but is influenced by political
legitimacy among national populations. This— choices which themselves are linked to the
as we argue—was one of the fundamental pre- competitive world system. Our proposition adds
requisites of the enormous economic growth in weight to the recently reactivated debate on the
that era, quite unprecedented in history. As economic growth implications of the welfare
compared to previous high growth phases in state, which has become a postwar solution by
capitalist development, growth rates doubled or core countries to achieve social peace and
even tripled in that Golden Age (Maddison, effective social order (see Korpi, 1985, for an
1982). When the coherence of the societal model overview of the debate).
dissolved, growth declined from the 1970s When we point to politically created competi-
through the early 1980s. In this paper we are not tive advantages we do not argue that govern-
concerned with cycles but with the whole epoch ment per se is favorable for capitalist growth,
as a unit of social change. Within the context of Quite the contrary. State action oriented
the changed societal model of that epoch we towards what we call a 'tribute logic' hinders
would expect those countries that were more long-term economic success in the world system,
successful in tempering social conflict to have The state, however, which emerged at the core
been even more successful economically, since of the modern world system is the result of a
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long process during which the 'tribute logic' had
to be given up in favor of the 'profit logic', and
eventually—in order to take advantage of
broader based legitimacy as a resource in the
competitive world system—the profit logic had
increasingly to be compromised with the 'logic
of legitimization'.
The 'world market for protection'
argument—to which we briefly turn in the next
section—suggests an explanation for the evol-
ution at the core of the world system. The
evolution of a certain logic of state action which
takes care of broader based legitimacy was the
outcome since it represented a comparative
advantage in the long run. Before we test
whether this proposition holds also in the
postwar era, we turn to the context of Western
core countries, the development of hypotheses
and the discussion of indicators.
Subsequently, we test, for core countries,
whether comparative economic success in the
postwar era was proportional to events of mass
political protest per million inhabitants, the
inverse of which we suggest as an exploratory
indicator of legitimacy. For these tests we
employ various controls; that is, initial wealth
and the quantitative role of government, the
latter in absolute as well as in relative terms. We
discuss the findings and add further exploratory
analyses of causal links between world system
forces, political structures and policies and
characteristics of the social structure.
THE 'WORLD MARKET FOR PROTECTION'
ARGUMENT
The theory underlying the 'world market for
protection' argument (Bornschier, 1988: ch. 14)
emphasizes that 'social order', what we also
term protection, is a public utility, although a
territorially bounded one. Thus, protection is a
neglected element of the national economic
production function. Governments—which can
be understood as political undertakings—
produce 'order' and sell this public utility to
capitalist enterprises, as well as to citizens under
their rule.
Three actors are relevant in the social system
which is interpreted as the 'world market for
protection'. Political undertakings—which we
normally call governments or states—are ulti-
mately defined by their claim to territorial
monopoly of physical force, which is also the
basis for their capacity to raise resources (tax-
ation being the modern form). This is called the
tribute logic. Capitalist enterprises combine
factors of production and sell products and
services on markets in order to make profits.
They are thus subject to the profit logic. The
large majority of citizens sell their labor power
to either political or economic undertakings to
gain an income and to make a living. Yet—
although subject to political and economic
power—citizens have a unique option to invest a
social order with various degrees of legitimacy.
They are subject to the logic of legitimization.
The degrees of legitimacy invested in a social
order we see as dependent on the extent to
which claims to security, equality and efficiency
are fulfilled. The compromise between these
contradictory orientations of the three actors is
regulated in the long run by the 'world market
for protection'.
Since there exist various political under-
takings offering 'social order', an important
element to characterize the constellation as a
market is fulfilled. Nevertheless, consumers of
'social order' are to varying degrees restricted
where they can buy that public utility. The
consumer choices are restricted because
migrants between territories incur costs: transfer
costs, loss of economic and social capital and
devaluation of cultural capital, to mention only
material ones.
Despite such (sometimes heavy) market
imperfections, the actual or threatened shift of
consumers to alternative supplies of effective
'social order' force different producers of that
territorially bounded public utility into a
competitive relationship. This may also be
simply the result of long-term economic conse-
quences of different types of 'social order'.
Since social order is a product with attached
utilities, it must be produced. In principle,
government can produce 'social order' either by
means of coercion, which rests on force as the
ultimate means of state power, or it can adopt
measures which change the social structure in
such a way that capitalists and/or the population
subject to the state's rule attach greater
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legitimacy to the social order.1 Although force
and legitimacy are partly substitutive measures
to produce 'social order', the world market for
protection argument maintains that only
effective social order represents a competitive
advantage in the longer run; that is, the one
which rests on legitimacy attached by citizens to
it. This proposition needs further comment.
The outcome of the 'market' at the core in
evolutionary perspective
Social order as a factor is not a homogeneous
product: it is of different qualities depending on
whether this protection is produced by force or
by attached legitimacy. In the latter case we
speak of high quality or of effective social order.
We must now introduce points on the social
basis of preferences for 'social order' of different
quality, applying the triple articulation: political
undertakings as suppliers of social order, capi-
talist enterprises and citizens as consumers of
that territorially bounded public utility.
Suppliers of protection are—in general—
clearly not indifferent to the quality they pro-
duce. Legitimacy as a source of protection limits
their power and thereby that portion of 'tax-
ation' they can consume as the ruling class. The
political ruling class comes under different
pressures. Private enterprises demand cheap
effective protection, and their threat to invest
abroad may force government to supply protec-
tion almost at cost. Thus the political 61ite has to
renounce part of its potential income, a part of
the income-generating capacity of the state
being eventually shifted from the luxury con-
sumption of political 61ites to protection rents of
capitalists. Of course, this historical shift has
accompanied democratization, but in compara-
tive perspective such an outcome was not the
rule, being largely restricted to core countries.
With regard to preferences of consumers of
protection, we consider first those citizens who
are clearly not indifferent. The majority prefers
a social order of high quality. Citizens have
three broad measures of resistance at their
disposal in order to combat an illegitimate
regime: (i) politico-military opposition to
government, (ii) political protest or votes
against office holders, and (iii) subtle measures
of refusal by reduction of commitment. The
opposition of citizens to a regime raises the costs
of control and suppression for those in political
power. They need to raise taxes to break or hold
down resistance, which increases the costs of the
state without improving the level and quality of
protection.
Refusal as a more subtle form of resistance
seems to be unspectacular, but should not be
underestimated. It is probably among the most
powerful weapons at the disposal of citizens, at
least in the long run and in the competitive
world environment. A reduction in commitment
seriously impairs productivity, since a lack of
consensus about the social order reduces motiv-
ation in general, and work motivation in par-
ticular. In purely economic terms such losses
may outweigh working days lost through strikes.
As employers, capitalist enterprises are thus
also not indifferent to the kind of protection
they can buy. Of course, in the first place they
prefer protection at low cost. But, subsequently,
induced by world competition, they are
interested in a motivated and loyal work force.
It would be naive to assume that the behavior of
employers in general is characterized by a search
for low costs per se. Primarily they optimize
profit, and this may be easier to achieve if the
factors of production they buy are of good
quality and thus worth their price.
If a state tries to break resistance in a popu-
lation by means of force, capitalist enterprises
suffer from two disadvantages. First, they
cannot rely any longer on a motivated work
force, and, second, they must pay more for
protection. Under such conditions capitalist pro-
duction is clearly not impossible, as we know
from numerous historical and contemporary
examples, but such social formations are neither
able to maintain nor attain core status in world
production.
The hypothesis is, then, that on the 'world
market for protection' sufficiently high quality
protection is preferred. However, protection of
high quality—effective social order which is
based on legitimacy—has not always been the
actual outcome of the world market at various
places and times. The reason is that we only
elaborate the argument for core societies.
Different solutions exist for other societies
which are not the topic of this paper. Another
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reason is that the reaction of the world
market—even at the core of the world system—
is sticky and does not penalize alternative
solutions immediately, but only in the longer
run.
To avoid falsifying history, we must acknowl-
edge certain regularities. The long run in more
successful social formations at the core has
always been characterized by protection options
that favor legitimacy. This should be understood
in comparative-historical terms, that is, as
compared to contemporary competitors. Only
because of this were they successful and, for a
while, leaders in capitalist development. Freer
arrangements of wage labor, more opportunities
for larger parts of the population and more
liberal institutions were typical for all the indus-
trial leaders of the modern world system. This
holds also when one goes far back to Venice or
North Holland. Over time this option, typical
for ascending social formations, became even
more urgent owing to increasing levels of indus-
trial complexity. Those who tried to 'row against
the tide' never reached the peaks of the world
industrial pyramid.
This pattern is, however, one of ascending
social formations, as well as of those that man-
age to keep on top. Declining ones, and declin-
ing hegemonies in particular, lose their position
also because they gamble away their earlier
competitive advantage in the protection market.
External protection rents of hegemons may
mask the decline for a while, but intensify it later
since they cause the Elites to neglect the claims
of domestic legitimacy.
The postwar societal model is conceived of as
a specific step in the evolution of the outcome on
the 'world market for protection' at the core.
Governments were either forced to behave
according to the requirement of a capitalist
state; that is, to renounce the tribute logic and to
take care of internal legitimacy, in order to
compete in the world system or they were
economically penalized in the long run. Under
this situation of effective social order, capitalist
enterprises and populations eventually share in
the advantages of that territorially bounded
public utility. What enterprises seem to give
away, as compared to cheaper solutions than
welfare states, they recuperate through a loyal
and motivated work force and through the
enlargement of their markets.
Acknowledging prior theoretical work
The ideas underlying the notion of a regulatory
mechanism of the 'world market for protection'
build on prior theoretical work, and it is only fair
to mention the most influential.
The idea of subordination of the tribute logic
of the state to the profit logic of capital in the
modern world system goes at least back to Max
Weber. While he seems to imply that this is a
characteristic of the world system as a whole, we
would rather suggest that this is the condition for
attaining or maintaining core status in the world
system.
After the turn of the century Weber added an
interesting new idea to the long history of think-
ing about the relationship between the state and
capitalism. Weber's (1923) reasoning is that the
continuous, formally peaceful or belligerent
struggle between competing states provided the
most excellent opportunities for modern capi-
talism. A given state had to compete for the
free-flowing capital that dictated the conditions
under which it was willing to help state power
develop. According to him, this constellation of
competing states is the prerequisite for the
development, as well as the perpetuation, of
capitalism. Capitalism will only last as long as no
world empire arises. This paragraph is now
inserted at the beginning of his sociology of the
state.2
The idea that both important processes of the
modern world system, that is, state formation
and capitalist development, are inextricably
interrelated—representing but two sides of the
same underlying social process (Hintze, 1929:
28)—was not fully elaborated by Weber, on
account of his early death. Yet it has influenced
various other theorists and recently received a
new and very interesting interpretation by
Chase-Dunn (1981, 1989) who regards capi-
talism as a system in which political and
economic processes can be understood to have a
single, integrated logic.3
Equally seminal was Weber's notion of
economic behavior. He introduces the analytical
distinction between economic and economically
motivated action (Weber, 1972: 31). Later Lane
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elaborated further the notion of economically
motivated behavior which uses force as a means,
and suggested that violence, under certain con-
ditions, may be productive (Lane, 1979: 5If).
Weber's seminal ideas thus laid the ground for
two things. First, the distinction between two
types of enterprise that developed in modern
times and which do not differ in their ends, but
only in the means of achieving them: tribute
versus profit logic. Second, the notion that not
only economic activity in the narrow sense, but
also force may be productive, and that 'violence-
controlling' elements must be included in
economic analysis.
But Hintze first formulated the idea of two
enterprises. According to him, the process of
modern state formation can be regarded as an
undertaking—a political undertaking alongside
the economic one. In the long run the political
undertaking can only be successful in striving for
power if it is able at the same time to satisfy the
vital needs of citizens. Service to the public lies
in the creation and supply of power to provide
security and legality (Hintze, 1929, reprinted
1964: 331f).
In the late work of Lane (1979) these theoreti-
cal ideas in the tradition of Weber and Hintze
reappear. Lane takes both the notion of two
types of enterprise and state power as a basis of
utility and profit. This is clearly evident in the
very title of his collection of essays Profits from
Power: Readings in Protection Rent and
Violence-Controlling Enterprises. In addition
Lane initiated a systematic treatment of the
problem in comparative perspective. What are
the consequences of protection if it is at certain
times and in certain places produced with more
ease or at lower cost?
In order fully to understand Lane's theorem
of protection rent, it must be acknowledged that
not only are capital, land, labor and technology
factors of production, but so also is protection.
Protection, although politically created, shares
certain characteristics with land, insofar as it is
also territorially bounded. Thus, there exist not
only land rents but also protection rents (Lane,
1979: 25).
The two theorems can be stated from the
point of view of states or capitalist enterprises:
(i) that state will be the strongest which can
'combine a moderate tribute with effective pro-
tection conducive to innovation and investment'
(Steensgaard, 1981: 271); and (ii) that capitalist
enterprise will prosper most which can choose,
or is fortunately placed in, a network of
economic transactions effectively protected at
low cost. Advantages thus accrue to both sides:
higher returns due to lower protection costs
provide protection rents for capitalists and
enhance their accumulation, and higher returns
due to more income to tax also provide a larger
resource basis for the state.
What we add to this history of thought4 is that
not the capitalist state per se is most favorable
for economic success, but the one that reconciles
the capitalist profit logic with the claims for
legitimacy among citizens, based on demands
for security, equality and efficiency. Although
legitimacy is attached, we suggest that its endur-
ing impact does not rest on ideology but on
features of the social structure which reflect the
fulfilment of such demands.
THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN CORE IN
THE POSTWAR ERA AND THE
HYPOTHESES
If the basic argument of the 'world market for
protection' is correct, we should also find
empirical evidence for the working of the theor-
etical mechanism over a much shorter time-
span. This is what we test in the next, empirical
section for 18 core countries between 1948 and
1980-83. Our main question is whether
legitimacy has been a comparative economic
advantage among core countries also in the
postwar era.
Our empirical study which tests the impact of
effective social order, as evidenced by the
absence of mass political protest, applies to a
selection in space and time. The test includes
only core countries5 since we expect specific
outcomes on the 'world market for protection' in
different subformations of the world system. By
our restriction to core countries we introduce
certain conditions which are noteworthy. The
institutional framework characterized by the
state under the rule of law, political democracy
and civil rights to quite freely express dissension
and opposition (and also beyond 'normal'
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politics) drastically narrows the range of options
between the use of force and measures that
enhance legitimacy. In the perspective of the
history of state formation governments in
postwar core countries employed comparatively
little overt force.6
The social techniques to elicit legitimacy
attached to a social order by citizens are time-
bound. In the postwar era of Western countries
those social techniques which are typical of the
welfare state emerge. A cluster of such policies,
which became very popular in several Western
countries, consists of quasi-corporatist arrange-
ments of conflict resolution, strategies to help
dampen class conflict, measures to redistribute
income (including substantial social security
mechanisms), measures to reduce inequality of
opportunities in status allocation through the
opening of the school system and other inter-
ventions.
Hypotheses, indicators and control variables
Already from the characterization of the whole
period under study as the welfare state era, it
becomes obvious that government played in
general a large role. Yet, more specifically, we
expect that rather the extent to which govern-
ment policies were successful in keeping social
conflict low provided a valuable asset, that is,
legitimacy, which resulted in comparative
national economic success.
We do not then imply that sheer measures of
size of government matter. Quite the contrary:
economic resources which the state controls but
which are not channelled into political action
that enhances legitimacy should rather have an
unfavorable impact on comparative economic
success (being relics or new forms of the tribute
logic).
In order to test the hypotheses of the com-
parative advantages of legitimacy, we rely in this
exploratory study on the frequency of mass
political protest events (weighted by the number
of citizens in millions). The inverse of this
conflict measure we take as an indicator of
'legitimacy'. This procedure is obviously not
without problems. Of course, frequent mass
political protest is an indicator of limited
legitimacy. But the absence of such protest need
not indicate legitimacy, but may only stand for
mere toleration of the social order or may only
be the consequence of government repression of
mass political conflict. The latter objection we
do not consider relevant in the context of core
Western societies, but it seems obviously of
importance in other societies. Yet the objection
that the absence of protest may indicate either
mere toleration or legitimacy we cannot rule out
in this exploratory study. The reader who is
sceptical about our interpretation of the
legitimacy indicator may simply interpret the
empirical results more straightforwardly:
absence of mass political protest.
When we test for the effect of legitimacy on
comparative economic success we have to con-
trol for size measures of government, in order to
show that the advantage is not simply a correlate
of government, but is politically created by a
specific set of measures which are at the core of
the welfare state model. Although we do not
analyze such measures in detail in our explora-
tory study, we point to some empirical correlates
of legitimacy as it is measured in this study.
There exists no single measure of the quan-
titative role of government since it depends on
the perspective. In national terms, the resources
which, for example, the Dutch state controls
may be quite impressive (government expen-
ditures of the Dutch state as compared to Dutch
GDP), but in absolute terms states in larger
countries have much more impressive resources
at hand. Thus, even if the relative share of
government were the same among Western so-
cieties (which is, of course, not the case), the
absolute size of government still differs enor-
mously. This is due to one important structural
feature in the world system; that is, the large
differences in the power base among states.
Since absolute government size may be a means
of influencing the world political economy, we
have to consider such a measure as a control
variable.
Furthermore, if a certain level of absolute
government size is necessary in the world
political economy in order to protect national
economic interests, the relative size of govern-
ment in smaller countries will be necessarily
larger than in bigger countries. Thus, we would
not expect the relative size per se to be unfavor-
able for economic success. Smaller countries are
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more forced by the world political economy to
bring both the perspective of the world economy
and the national economy together. In order to
be competitive at the core, they have to increase
state strength, but have to use it in a way that
increases internal legitimacy. This is the more
the case if a small country is highly integrated
into the world political economy.7
We pointed to the possible impact of power in
the world political economy on economic
success and have at least to mention that
membership in trading blocs may also be an
important factor. Although we cannot go into
details here, we consider a first and rudimentary
control for such membership. Trade among the
core countries was for only part of the period
under study (1948-83) effectively regulated by
the international regime laid down in the GATT
rules (non-discrimination and liberalization).
The exercise of power in international trade
relations became more important after 1971-73.
Finally, over the period under study new trading
blocs emerged, like the EEC, while the
(British) Commonwealth of Nations disinte-
grated.
Moreover, we would like to point to another
variable which we consider to be very important
for explaining comparative economic success;
that is, the catch-up or late-comer effect. The
United States emerged out of World War II as
the consolidated economic and political
hegemonic power. As compared to Japan and
large parts of Europe, which faced heavy
economic disruption and destruction, the US
entered the postwar era strengthened. The US
initially took a clear lead in the new economic
sectors that gave most dynamism to the postwar
boom. Thus, in terms of industrial development,
but also in standard of living and spread of mass
consumption, the US was far ahead, at the core
of the core, while the other core countries
lagged behind, although to quite different
degrees. This, for example, is evidenced by the
considerable spread and range of GNP per
capita in 1950, when the US GNP per capita—
the highest at that time—was 10 times the lowest
figure, that for Japan. In the postwar period,
however, the other core countries caught up
markedly, those with the lowest initial GNP per
capita growing on the average faster. This catch-
up effect, limited as it was to core countries, we
will control in the empirical study.
Finally, our concept of comparative economic
success needs some comment. In order to test
the impact of our explanatory variable,
legitimacy, we need to cover a long period since
we expect the effects to work gradually but
cumulatively. The frequently used measure of
real growth rates of economic aggregate figures,
TABLE 1 Indicators used in the empirical study
Alternatives for the dependent variable: economic success
- The ratio of a country's share in total GNP of the core,
1980 and 1955: (GNP 1980/GNP 1955, times 100). The
source is the World Bank (1971, 1983).
- The ratio of a country's GNP per capita, 1985 and 1960:
(GNP per capita 1985/GNP per capita 1960, times 100).
The source is the World Bank.
- The ratio of a country's share in total world exports, 1983
and 1953. The source is UNCTAD (1976) and Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics (various issues).
Test variables
- Mass political protest, 1948-77, per million inhabitants in
1965. This indicator includes all events of anti-government
demonstrations, riots and political strikes and relates them
to the total population. The source is Taylor and Jodice
(1983: II; 16ff). The source reports for the years 1948 to
1977 total 7,742 events for all 18 countries. (Hibbs (1973)
has demonstrated that the above-mentioned conflict items
load on one factor, which was confirmed by our own factor
analysis.)
Note: we interpret the inverse of political mass protest
as an indicator of legitimacy.
- Initial wealth as indicated by GNP per capita in 1950
(World Bank, 1971).
Control variables
- Relative size of government over the 1948-77 period,
indicated by government expenditures as a share of GDP,
averages for the figures for 1950, 1960 and 1977. The
sources are Schmidt (1982) and OECD (1985).
- Absolute size of government over the 1948-77 period,
indicated by government expenditures in US-dollars. This
variable is constructed by multiplying the government
share by total GDP.
- Loss of external protection due to disintegration of the
(British) Commonwealth of Nations, represented by a
dummy variable with the value one for the members of the
Commonwealth in our sample (United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand) and with the value zero for all
other core countries.
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like the GNP, has clearly limitations since
revaluations of national currencies under the
regime of floating exchange rates since the 1970s
have an impact on national economic wealth.
This is of even greater importance if countries
trade considerably across borders.
Therefore, we do not consider real growth
rates but compare the relative position at the
beginning and the end of the period under study.
As the dimension of comparison we use the total
national product converted to US-dollars, and
mention also our findings for gross national
product per capita and for shares in world
exports. To illustrate the nature of such com-
parative economic success measures: the
Netherlands in 1953 had a share in total world
exports of 2-6 per cent and one of 3-6 per cent in
1983. Since the same increase in percentage
points means quite different things for small
initial shares in world exports than for large
ones, we relate the later share to the initial share
and obtain growth rates of shares.
Design and model
We underline that we analyze the postwar era as
an epoch, the one in which the welfare state was
institutionalized and expanded. Ultimately, dur-
ing the 1970s, this societal model seems to have
approached limits and lost some of its initial
cohesive power, albeit to varying degrees in
different countries. We characterize the whole
period from 1948 to 1977 by an indicator of mass
political protest which we interpret as relative
lack of legitimacy and do not consider changes in
legitimacy over this time.8 Instead we compare
differences in solutions to moderate the ever-
present social conflict over the whole epoch and
relate them to comparative economic success
among the core countries.
Our causal hypothesis is difficult to test since
we take a whole epoch as our unit of analysis. In
order to include a causal ordering in our design,
we estimate the lagged effect of legitimacy in the
1948-77 period on economic performance from
the mid-1950s to the early 1980s. The results we
obtain with this method are checked by estimat-
ing lagged cross-panel regressions. The advan-
tage of such a design is that we can rule out false
causal inferences, but this is achieved at the
expense of basing our observations of mass
political conflict on shorter periods.
The test model we apply proposes that our
measure of comparative economic success is
proportional to the inverse of mass political
protest and the inverse of initial wealth. To this
model we add in a second step control variables.
The model is given with Equation 1.
Equation 1
'"77
where:
y' denotes the estimated growth ratio,
a is a constant (which represents unmeasured
growth effects),
x denotes mass political protest, and
z represents initial wealth.
The model in Equation 1 specifies non-linear
relationships. In order to be able to apply linear
regression estimates, we have to transform the
model into linear relationships. This can be done
by taking natural logarithms.
Equation 2
hi y' = In a — brln x — b2-ln z
The model specified in Equation 2 can be
estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) tech-
niques. In order to show that such a log-linear
model yields better results, and thus
corroborates our non-linear specification of
effects, we report also the results for linear
effects between the variables.
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
Table 2 presents the results of regressing the
ratio of GNP 1980/GNP 1955 on mass political
protest, on initial GNP per capita, and on three
controls in log-linear form. Equation 1 includes
only the two main predictors without further
controls.
Initial GNP per capita has a significant and
very substantial negative effect on comparative
GNP growth. The same applies to mass political
protest, which has a significant and substantial
negative effect of the GNP growth ratio. Both
predictors are virtually independent: the corre-
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TABLE 2 Dependent variable: comparative economic success, as measured by GNP growth. Linear OLS-estimates for
ln(100*GNP 1980/GNP1955)W
Predictors
hi of mass political protest, 1948-77 per mill,
inhabitants, 1965
In of initial wealth, i.e., GNP per capita 1950
hi of relative size of government expenditures,
1950-77
hi of absolute size of government expenditures, 1955
Dummy for Commonwealth membership
Intercept
R2, corrected for degrees of freedom
Equation
b = -0-267
beta = -0-50
b = -0-558
beta = -0-80
not included
not included
not included
9-249
0-82
t =
P =
t =
P =
1
4-92
00002
7-78
00001
Equation 2
b = -0-268
beta = -0-51
b = -0-540
beta = -0-77
b = -0-478
beta = - 0 1 8
not significant
not significant
10-792
0-85
t =
P =
t =
P =
t =
P =
5-37
= 00001
812
= 0-0001
1-94
0073
Note: (a) The insignificant predictors in Equation 2 were removed from the final regression.
lation between initial wealth and mass political
protest is r = - 0 0 6 .
In Equation 2 it is tested whether our control
variables (relative and absolute size of govern-
ment expenditure and Commonwealth member-
ship) have an impact. Only for the measure of
relative size of government do we obtain a
negative effect. But this effect leaves those for
initial wealth and for mass political protest
almost unchanged. Again, the intercorrelations
between the independent variables are prac-
tically zero (relative size of government with
mass political protest: r = —001, and with initial
wealth: r = 0-14). The effects of the other
control variables are insignificant.
Robustness of regression in log-linear form
The regression of the GNP growth ratio on
initial wealth alone, on mass political protest
alone and on relative size of government alone
are presented in Figure 1. Removing outliers
from the regressions yields still very significant
results for initial wealth and for mass political
protest, whereas removing the outlier on rela-
tive size of government from the sample (Japan,
with the lowest value on this variable and the
highest value on GNP growth ratio) makes the
effect of relative size of government expenditure
drop to insignificance (t = 0-88).
Does only the log-linear specification produce
the results?
When we regress the GNP growth ratio on the
predictors, and both dependent and indepen-
dent variables are now in un-logged form, we
obtain the same structure of results as listed in
Table 2, albeit with a less significant total regres-
sion because non-linearities are now involved.
But in this case also both initial GNP per capita
and mass political protest have significant nega-
tive effects on GNP growth, whereas that of the
relative size of government expenditures is again
negative, but again not robust.
Intermediate conclusion
We find for 18 core countries that mass political
protest, 1948-77 per million inhabitants and
initial GNP per capita, 1950 have substantial
negative effects on the growth of GNP between
1955 and 1980. The quantitative role of govern-
ment has either no effect at all, or the negative
effect of (relative size of) government is not
robust because it rests only on the impact of a
single outlier. Since we interpret mass political
protest as an indicator of relative lack of
legitimacy, we can conclude that legitimacy has
been an economic advantage, whereas the quan-
titative role of government as such had no
economic growth impact.
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FIGURE 1 Zero order regressions of the variables in Equation 2 of Table 2.
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TABLE 3 Dependent variable: comparative economic success, as measured by share in world exports. Linear OLS-estimates
for ln(100* export share 1983/export share 1953)^
Predictors
hi of mass political protest, 1948-77 per mill,
inhabitants, 1965
hi of initial wealth, i.e., GNP per capita 1950
hi of relative size of government expenditures,
1950-77
hi of absolute size of government expenditures, 1955
Dummy for Commonwealth membership
Intercept
R2, corrected for degrees of freedom
Equation
b = -0191
beta = -0-22
b = -0-9%
beta = -0-86
not included
not included
not included
11-886
0-73
t =
P =
t =
P =
1
1-73
0105
6-82
00001
Equation 2
b = -0196
beta = -0-22
b = -0-896
beta = -0-77
not significant
b = 0-089
beta = 0-19
b = -0-474
beta = -0-33
10-767
0-86
t = 2-49
p = 0-027
t = 7-72
p = 0-0001
t = 209
p = 0-056
t = 3-36
p = 0-005
Note: (a) The insignificant predictors in Equation 2 were removed from the final regression.
The remaining analyses test in a first step (i)
whether this finding holds for other indicators of
comparative economic success and (ii) whether
the results are similar in a lagged cross-panel
regression design. In a second step we present
initial evidence for the causal chain between
external constraints and internal legitimacy.
GNP per capita growth ratio (1985/1960) as the
dependent variable
Again we test the model in the log-linear form.
GNP per capita 1985/GNP per capita 1960 is now
the dependent variable. In order to avoid rep-
etition, we simply mention the results. Mass
political protest and initial GNP per capita are
also significant predictors of GNP per capita
growth. Relative size of government expen-
ditures has a significant negative effect which is,
again, not robust once we remove only one
outlier. In addition to these findings, which are
very much the same as those of Table 2, we
estimate a negative effect of Commonwealth
membership on GNP per capita growth between
1960 and 1985.
Growth of share in world exports (1983/1953) as
dependent variable
The effects estimated for a model in log-linear
form are listed in Table 3. Again, both initial
GNP per capita and mass political protest have
significant negative effects on export share
growth. The regression estimate for mass
political protest is—although significant—
weaker than for GNP growth (cf. Table 2), while
the effect for initial wealth is stronger. Absolute
size of government expenditures has a significant
positive effect, while the effect of relative size is
now insignificant. Commonwealth membership
has a substantial negative effect.
We conclude that in the case of export per-
formance additional variables which indicate
power (or loss of power) in the world political
economy seem to play an important role besides
domestic legitimacy and initial wealth.
Test to exclude false causal inferences
Was a sound economic performance helpful in
keeping social conflict low, or does causality also
run the other way round, as our hypothesis
suggests? Our design comparing whole social
epochs makes causal testing difficult and our
time-lag design so far is no proof of causality.
Figure 2 presents the results for a lagged cross-
panel regression model that includes measures
of mass political protest between 1948-67 and
1968-82. We estimate a significant negative
effect of mass political protest in the period
1948-67 on later GNP, whereas GNP in 1955 has
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b= 1.018 (t=24.81, p=.0001)
In GNP 1955
.04
In of mass political
protest. 1948-1967
In GNP 1980
b= -.151 (t=2.32, p=.O36)
.15
In of mass political
protest, 1968-1982 J
FIGURE 2 Lagged cross-panel regressions^')
Note: (a) Both In GNP 1980 and In of mass political protest 1968-82 have been regressed also on initial wealth. This variable
(not represented in the graph) has a significant effect on In GNP 1980 but no effect on In mass political protest
1968-52.
no effect on later mass political protest. It is,
furthermore, interesting to note that the mass
political protest in the two consecutive periods is
virtually unrelated.
The additional test employing lagged cross-
panel regressions cannot rule out our causal
interpretation that mass political protest reduces
comparative economic success. Such a main
causal effect does, of course, not exclude feed-
backs between legitimacy (absence of mass pro-
test) and economic success.
DISCUSSION AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
First we would like to point to what we consider
to be our main findings.
(i) Countries with lower initial wealth had an
economic advantage over others. This catch-up
effect among core societies proved to be very
strong.
(ii) Furthermore, countries with a lower per
million level of mass political protest, 1948-77,
had greater comparative economic success in the
period between the mid-1950s and early 1980s.
This holds for three measures of economic
success (see above). This finding appears to be
robust, and additional tests suggest that our
causal interpretation cannot be ruled out.
(iii) We did not find the quantitative role of
government over the 1948-77 period to be sub-
stantially related to comparative economic
success. Either the effect was not robust or
small.
We interpret our findings in the following
way: the inverse of mass political protest we
consider as an indication of legitimacy among
the population attached to the social order.
Thus, legitimacy or 'effective social order' has
been a competitive advantage in the postwar era
among Western core countries. It was therefore
not government invervention as such which mat-
tered but intervention that could elicit
legitimacy among the citizens. This appears to us
as an often neglected aspect in the debate on the
welfare state.
Thus far we only have a limited number of
other empirical results with which to compare
the main finding of this paper. Earlier findings
(Bornschier, 1988) are corroborated by the
more rigorous test we employed here.
Negative associations between political pro-
test and economic growth indicators are also
reported in previous research (Hibbs, 1973: 38;
Jagodzinski, 1983: 36). In contrast to these
earlier findings for world samples of countries,
the effect revealed in our study appears
remarkably robust and is more substantial. One
reason for this difference may be that we con-
fined the analysis to core countries and con-
sidered a whole epoch, the postwar era.
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World system forces (external constraints)
(position in the world system and relative
importance of world economic links)
Internal characteristics of policy formulation and
conflict resolution
(internal procedures aimed at dampening
conflict)
Outcomes of policies and socioeconomic
characteristics
(characteristics of the social structure which
are appreciated or disliked by citizens)
- • Legitimacy with which citizens invest the social order
. (motivation and satisfaction which affects
labor productivity as well as entrepreneurial
I efforts)
Comparative economic success in the competitive
world system, net of other factors
FIGURE 3 A flow chart of causal links
Korpi (1985) found measures of welfare
spending to be significantly positively associated
with growth of GDP per capita as well as growth
of productivity in the period 1950 to 1973, and
also from 1973 to 1979, for 17 OECD countries.9
Korpi's findings are highly compatible with ours.
The difference from our design is that he
employed measures to achieve legitimacy while
we measured legitimacy itself, which may be
based on quite different social techniques. Thus
Korpi had to exclude the case of Japan in order
to obtain significant results, a country which
partly uses different means to achieve legitimacy
(Bornschier, 1988, ch. 13).
In this paper we have broached the question
of social techniques with which protection is
'produced' by the state, but no more than inci-
dentally. Only briefly have we mentioned back-
ground variables that tend to affect the need to
tackle domestic legitimacy. Such background
variables arise from the position a country
occupies in the world system. Smaller countries
are, in general, more exposed to the world
market. In Figure 3 we suggest a causal chain
between world system forces (external con-
straints) and efforts to achieve legitimacy among
citizens.
Such a causal chain is compatible with prior
work on world market links and internal charac-
teristics (Cameron, 1978; Schmidt, 1982;
Bornschier, 1988: 285f) as well as with Coser's
(1956) 'proposition 9', derived from the work of
Simmel (1908).
We do not discuss and test this causal chain in
more detail here but simply point to some
illustrative correlations that suggest initial
support for the underlying hypotheses. As
indicators we consider preliminary variables.
Table 4 lists the correlations between indicators
on each level of the causal chain with legitimacy,
that is, the inverse of mass political protest.
The findings in Table 4 suggest that legitimacy
is related to background variables as well as to
internal characteristics. Furthermore, there exist
significant correlations between the indicators of
the different levels of the causal chain (not given
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TABLE 4 Zero order correlations with legitimacy
(N = 18) r = 0-46 t = 2-07 p = 0055
Correlation with legitimacy, i.e., the inverse of
mass political protest, 1948-77, per million
population in 1965
World system forces
Indicator: exports as a share of GDP, 1960
Internal characteristics: policy formulation and conflict resolution
Indicator: quasi-corporatist forms of policy formulation (N = 18) rho = 0-64 z = 2-64 p = 0-02
Indicator: frequent high economic strike volume as a climate variable (N = 18) r = —0-48 t = 2-18 p = 0-04
Outcome of policies and socioeconomic characteristics
Indicator: redistribution of income through the state, about 1970 (N = 13) r = 0-55 t = 2-16 p = 0-05
Indicator: openness of society as measured by overall intergenerational
occupational mobility (N = 15) r = 0-65 t = 2-97 p = 001
Indicator: social control by means of domestic security forces (as share
of total employment around 1965) (N = 14) r = -0-48 t = 1-88 p = 0085
Sources: The data can be found in Bornschier (1988, notes to ch. 15), except for occupational mobility where we rely on
unpublished findings by Michael Nollert, and for exports as share of GDP (see Bornschier and Heintz, 1979). Note:
quasi-corporatist forms of policy formulation is a rank scale; therefore, we compute the rank correlation.
in the table) which give prima facie support to
the whole argument.
One fruitful line of future research would be
to establish more systematic empirical evidence
on the structurally determined, as well as time-
bound range of state policy options—on how
they are combined to produce protection as well
as how successful such policies are over the
long-run to achieve the attribution of legitimacy
among citizens. Since legitimacy is attributed,
further research should also investigate our
claim that mere ideology, that is, without
changes in the social structure that provide a
basis for high quality social order, does not
result in an enduring favorable effect on
economic success.
Concluding remark
We could not reject the hypothesis that
politically created effective social order matters
for long-term economic success. Effective social
order in which citizens invest legitimacy we
found to be associated with various indicators of
economic performance over a 30 year period.
In historical perspective, we furthermore
observed from previous research that countries
which enjoyed high quality protection had an
edge over their competitors in the world system
(Bornschier, 1988, ch. 11). This limited the
choice of governments in producing protection.
The 'world market for protection' thus seems to
regulate political undertakings in the long run
through the differential economic success associ-
ated with differences in 'social order' that they
provide. The 'world market for protection' argu-
ment may thus tell us something about why
social structures, including the state, converged
at the core of the world system.
The sanctioning of that specific social system
to which Max Weber first drew our attention
seems to have been powerful. Social formations
which did not conform could not attain or
maintain core status. This is a historical lesson,
which we should not forget when we think about
the future of the welfare state. There is no
reason to accuse the welfare state of having
generally been a 'leaky bucket'.10 Rather it was
an indispensable 'irrigation system', one of the
bases for success. But this applies to the qualitat-
ive, not to the mere quantitative role of
government.
NOTES
1. Under force we subsume all actual or threatened acts
that aim at compelling actors to behave in a specific way
or to avoid certain behavior, whatever the various
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measures of force may be (threat of physical harm to
persons and property, curtailment of freedom to act, to
move, to express opinions or to trade). Insofar as force
is exercised on the basis of laws, we speak of a state
under the rule of law or of an international order based
on international law. Legality and democracy within a
state territory substantially narrows the application of
force. Legitimacy is extended by actors according to the
degree to which they acknowledge and accept the rules
of social action and their results. A collection of recent
works that reflect the ambiguities and problems associ-
ated with the term legitimacy in sociological thought can
be found in Current Sociology (1987). Perfect legitimacy
would occur if perfect consensus about values, norms
and procedures exists. There are links between legality
and legitimacy. But even under conditions of democracy
these links are neither perfect nor sometimes even
substantial. The missing congruence of both terms
is reflected in the semantic meanings of legal
CgesetzmSssig') and legitimate ('anerkannt'). Even if the
subjection to laws is based on majority vote, legality and
legitimacy may not be congruent.
2. First published in Weber (1923). Later added to
Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft by Johannes
Winckelmann, 5th edition, 1972, p. 815.
3. Kennedy (1987) also sees the political and military
rivalry of states and the world economy as a mutually
interdependent unity subordinated to an embracing
overall logic.
4. Elements of the 'world market for protection' argument
are also compatible—while others differ—with ideas
expressed in the work of Parsons (1964), Spencer (1880,
1969), and of Buchanan (1980).
Parsons (1964) suggests that evolutionary universals
provide an edge to those societies which develop them
first. Among such evolutionary universals he points to
legitimization as an explicit societal task. This idea is
compatible with our proposition. Furthermore, the
difference between the tribute and profit logic are also
mentioned by Parsons, although in a different termin-
ology. The same is true for the distinction between
military and industrial society in the work of Spencer
(1880, 1969). Recently a dualism of orientations
appeared in the new political economy under the labels
of 'rent seeking' and 'profit seeking' (Buchanan, 1980;
Tollison, 1982). Originally rent-seeking action was seen
on the part of individuals who wish to manipulate the
state; lately, this perspective has been extended to the
behavior of the state itself.
In contrast to Parsons, Spencer and Buchanan, we
analyze the two distinct logics within the framework of a
specific overarching historic social system that emerged
at the core of the modern world system and triggered
thrusts of social change within individual societies,
dictated by the need to increase legitimacy as a resource
in the competitive world system. Davis (1961) also
points to the selective effect of the international system
for social change. In addition to earlier theoretical work
mentioned in the text, our argument also explicitly
covers the welfare state era. In terms of the economic
growth implications of the welfare state—see also
below—we differ form Olson (1982), who seems to
imply that any attempt at coordination of economic
action other than through 'pure' market forces retards
economic growth. For the debate, see also Korpi (1985).
5. We select the countries according to the following two
criteria in the postwar era: (i) high and homogeneous
capital development throughout society and (ii) a power
distribution that conforms to what Dahl (1971) has
called polyarchy. At the operational level we select
countries with high per capita income (as a measure of
aggregate economic efficiency) which are not charac-
terized by substantial intersectoral income differences,
and which have been formal democracies throughout
the entire period under study. From this sample we
exclude those with very small populations (Iceland and
Luxemburg) as well as one involved in quasi-continuous
warfare (Israel). The resulting sample consists of 18
countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, the German Federal
Republic, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States.
6. Force as represented by negative government sanctions
over the period (Taylor and Jodice, 1983: II, 61 ff) has
been present in our sample of the 18 countries (a total
number of 5,658 events are reported in the source). But
in the sample the number of political protest events
(from which we derive our indicator of domestic
legitimacy, see below) appears to be very highly
correlated with government sanctions over the whole
period (r = 0-86). Thus, there is little independent
variation of government force, most of it being identical
with variations in political protest.
7. There exist studies on the relationships between the
exposure to world trade, relative size of government and
specific political arrangements and policies geared at
enhancing consensus (see, Cameron, 1978; Boli-
Bennett, 1980; Schmidt, 1982; Bornschier, 1988: 285f).
8. For changes in legitimacy over time, see Bornschier
(1988, ch. 7, and ch. 15, pp. 399ff).
9. Korpi's measure of welfare spending was social security
expenditures related to GDP. He also reports that the
coefficient for the relative size of the public sector
becomes negative when Japan is included. Korpi (1985:
105) further summarizes earlier findings reporting nega-
tive effects of public sector size.
10. The metaphors 'leaky bucket' and 'irrigation system' we
take from Korpi (1985).
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